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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between postmodernist discourses and feminist discourses, 
asking, firstly, whether or not feminist political action is possible within a postmodernist 
theoretical climate that scrutinizes the construction of universalizing group identities, and, 
secondly, how political action might be undertaken in such a theoretical climate.  I contend that 
Carol Shields, reflecting the postmodernist ideology of Jean-François Lyotard and Patricia 
Waugh, creates Daisy Goodwill Flett‟s absence in The Stone Diaries.  This absence, in turn, acts 
to acknowledge the gaps in knowledge that exist within self-legitimating grand narratives.  It 
demonstrates that Daisy‟s performance of these grand narratives, particularly heteronormativity, 
necessarily obstructs her voice and, thereby, marginalizes her ability to act politically within that 
narrative.  The Stone Diaries, then, calls for a plural public space by exposing what remains 
unknown—women‟s lives and narratives—within the current public space. 
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In many ways, [Daisy] is like so many women of this century who became, in 
fact, nothing.  Their lives did not hold many choices.  They were this huge army 
of women, they were mainly voiceless, they were defined by the people around 
them.  And that became the trick of writing [The Stone Diaries], to write a 
biography of this woman‟s life—but it‟s a life from which she herself is absent. 
— Carol Shields (“Always a Book-Oriented Kid” 51, emphasis added)  
 
I have this impulse to see fiction as a form of redemption, to redeem what 
otherwise might be lost.  
— Carol Shields (“Always a Book-Oriented Kid” 52, emphasis added) 
   
  I begin with these two passages because they represent a fundamental paradox that has 
yet to be examined in Carol Shields‟s most celebrated work, her Pulitzer-winning novel The 
Stone Diaries.  The first of the passages makes it clear that Shields means to concern herself with 
women‟s issues, particularly the erasure of women within historical narratives.  Her creative 
works, which Marta Dvorak believes represent a “poetics of the quotidian” in their “uncanny 
ability to re/present the details of everyday life, to anatomize the mundane” (57), demonstrate a 
belief in the need to redeem lost or marginalized voices, prompting Alex Ramon to suggest that 
her fiction may be viewed as “fundamentally (counter-)historical, offering the opportunity for a 
minute examination of the life and voices that „slip through the net of history‟ and an excavation 
of its apparent „empty cavities‟” (127, quoting a book review by Shields).  Within The Stone 
Diaries, Daisy Goodwill Flett represents just such an “empty cavity,” but if Shields does intend 
to redeem Daisy, she goes about it in a seemingly counterproductive way, for Daisy remains 
absent throughout the novel.  Consequently, a paradox is created that centers on the terms 
redemption and absence as they are used to describe Shields‟s art and Daisy respectively: 
redemption seemingly demands presence within one‟s socio-historical narrative in order to 
expose “what otherwise might be lost,” while absence, by definition, is the lack of presence.  
What would happen, however, if one looked at Daisy‟s absence as a way to challenge 
redemptive strategies themselves? 
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Most redemptive strategies that focus on creating a discursive space from which 
marginalized people can express themselves have focused on establishing a unified subjectivity 
capable of adequately representing one political ideology shared by their constituents.  Through 
this subjectivity, members of the marginalized group can, in theory, discover the agency needed 
to begin challenging those grand narratives (gender, class, race, and so on) that limit their actions 
by prescribing normative behaviour.  Freedom in this conception of politics is, as Linda Zerilli 
points out in Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, equated with sovereignty, as agency consists 
of achieving power over the Others who also inhabit the public space.  Thus, in what Zerilli calls 
the “category of women debates of the late 1980s and 1990s” (11), it was postulated that, contra 
postmodernist discourses which seek the deconstruction of subjective positions, feminisms 
require the construction of unified feminine subjectivities to act as the center of epistemological 
frameworks capable of determining feminist political actions within the public space.  Shields 
subverts this strategy for redemption by creating Daisy as a character who lacks that “kernel of 
authenticity, that precious interior ore that everyone around her seem[s] to possess” (75).  Using 
the differences between the way that her characters Cuyler Goodwill and his daughter Daisy 
revise their identities, Shields demonstrates that women‟s alterior social positioning leads to a 
deeply contingent and relational subjectivity.  Such contingency restricts entrance into feminist 
conceptions of the public space that demand sovereignty acquired through unitary subjectivity.  
Therefore, redemption—in other words, recognition within the public space where narratives are 
recounted and enacted—must be conceived in another way.  Daisy‟s redemption, I contend, may 
be found in the liminal space that her absence acknowledges within the public sphere, as, far 
more than merely exposing the absence of women within historical narratives, Shields creates 
that absence in the middle of her book and, thereby, acknowledges what is unknown within these 
narratives.  
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Creating Female Subjectivity in the Postmodern World 
Shields‟s comments regarding postmodernism offer insight into the role that 
postmodernist discourses play in her fiction.  In an interview with Eleanor Wachtel, she says that 
“[s]ome postmodernists think there is no point beyond the language game, but I think there can 
be—and I don‟t know why we have to talk about these two forms of fiction [naturalism and 
postmodernism].  Why we can‟t have something in the middle—which is, I suppose, what I‟m 
trying to do.  Because postmodernist ideas do allow you to do things that you can‟t do as a 
naturalist” (44).  Her concerns with postmodernist discourses seem commensurate with those 
that Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson raise in “Social Criticism without Philosophy: An 
Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism.”  They suggest that postmodernist discourses 
are capable of “sophisticated and persuasive criticisms of foundationalism and essentialism, but 
their conceptions of social criticism tend to be anemic” (20), while feminist discourses, 
conversely, tend to “offer robust conceptions of social criticism, but they tend at times to lapse 
into foundationalism and essentialism” (20).  Thus, Shields imagines that her work occupies the 
role of negotiator between two seemingly incompatible forms of fiction.  In order to explore the 
way that Shields makes use of postmodernist discourses in her feminist fiction, I will examine 
the absence of Daisy in terms of the paralogical legitimation of knowledge espoused by Jean-
François Lyotard in his important treatise The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
and examine her identity in terms of the complications and revisions that Patricia Waugh makes 
to postmodernist discourses about knowledge and the subject in Feminine Fictions: Revisiting 
the Postmodern. 
In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard problematizes the production of knowledge in the 
Western tradition by noting that the grand narratives used to establish collective consciousness 
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are self-legitimating structures that depend upon performance to maintain their coherence.  
According to Lyotard, grand narratives are, in fact, metanarratives, for, as he states,  
the people are only that which actualizes the narratives:. . .they do this not only by 
recounting them, but also by listening to them and recounting themselves through 
them; in other words, by putting them into “play” in their institutions—thus by 
assigning themselves the posts of narratee and diegesis as well as the post of 
narrator. . . . They thus define what has the right to be said and done in the culture 
in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are 
legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do. (23)   
Far from representing knowledge, then, these metanarratives prescribe and, thereby, limit the 
speech and actions of those people who construct their knowledge based upon the narratives, and 
their consequent performance of these actions serves as validation for the narratives‟ structure 
and augments their power.  Thus, Lyotard‟s short statement “[c]onsensus has become an 
outmoded and suspect value” (66) captures the spirit of many postmodernist discourses, which 
advocate the use of fragmentation, deconstruction, and skepticism as tools with which to 
challenge the existence of an Archimedean viewpoint (an all-seeing, all-encompassing 
subjectivity) capable of legitimating the denotative statements that construct knowledge.  
Universalizing conceptions of knowledge are dispersed using these techniques, allowing the 
existence of knowledges as those people who were silenced within grand narratives are afforded 
the opportunity to present counter-narratives that challenge these accepted knowledge structures. 
Deconstructing grand narratives, according to Lyotard, is possible because of the 
linguistic pragmatism used to construct them: all narratives, he contends, construct knowledge 
through reference to a singular initial axiom, so all subsequent denotative statements are 
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legitimated in accordance with their fidelity to this initial axiom (42).  However, this structure 
leads to 
[t]wo noteworthy properties of scientific knowledge. . .: the flexibility of its 
means, that is, the plurality of its languages; and its character as a pragmatic 
game. . . . Another result is that there are two kinds of “progress” in knowledge: 
one corresponds to a new move (a new argument) within the established rules; the 
other, to the invention of new rules, in other words, a change to a new game. (43) 
What Lyotard advocates, then, is a knowledge that remains dynamic.  Bombarded by the 
seemingly paralogical “new moves” or “petits récits” (little narratives) (60)1 of those groups that 
are generally marginalized within grand narratives, postmodern theory is led to recognize and 
challenge the “metaprescriptives” or presuppositions that ground and stabilize knowledge in the 
Western tradition (65).  The construction of knowledge in such an “open system” becomes 
accordant with a denotative statement‟s ability to generate an idea as each statement is “deemed 
worth retaining the moment it marks a difference from what is already known” (64); 
consequently, knowledge, rather than being dependent upon legitimation established through 
performance, becomes more retrospective as others within the system interact with and challenge 
each new statement.  Thus, postmodern thought, Lyotard suggests, is “theorizing its own 
evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical” (60) because it 
explains not what is present in knowledge but what is not present. 
Postmodernist discourses such as Lyotard‟s have come under increasing scrutiny in 
recent years as the very marginalized groups to whom they promise discursive freedom 
                                                 
1
 A paralogism is defined in the OED as “a piece of illogical or fallacious reasoning, especially one which appears 
superficially logical” (“Paralogism”).  In Lyotard‟s theory, this term is used to denote the continual destabilizing 
effect that “little narratives” have upon the linguistic pragmatism that structures knowledge.  These “new moves” 
may appear illogical inasmuch as they do not conform to the initial axiom that structures language and knowledge 
within the grand narrative, but they are valuable according to Lyotard because they produce “blind spots and defer[] 
consensus” (61), inevitably creating a situation in which universality is abandoned and replaced with a conception of 
knowledge that remains in constant flux and is limited both temporally and spatially (66). 
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challenge the applicability of postmodernist ideas to their specific critical needs.  Christine Di 
Stefano, in “Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism,” succinctly 
defines four challenges that postmodernist discourses pose to continued feminist criticism: 
First, that postmodernism expresses the claims and needs of a constituency 
(white, privileged men of the industrialized West) that has already had an 
Enlightenment for itself and that is now ready and willing to subject that legacy to 
critical scrutiny.  Secondly, that the objects of postmodernism‟s various critical 
and deconstructive efforts have been the creations of a similarly specific and 
partial constituency (beginning with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle).  Third, that 
mainstream postmodernist theory (Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault) has been 
remarkably blind and insensitive to questions of gender in its own purportedly 
politicized rereadings of history, politics, and culture.  Finally, that the 
postmodernist project, if seriously adopted by feminists, would make any 
semblance of a feminist politics impossible.  To the extent that feminist politics is 
bound up with a specific constituency or subject, namely, women, the 
postmodernist prohibition against subject-centered inquiry and theory undermines 
the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement dedicated to articulating and 
implementing the goals of such a constituency.  (75-76) 
These four points may be summarized in two questions: 1) Can postmodernist discourses 
adequately represent the narratives of marginalized groups such as women?  2) Can marginalized 
groups act politically in a postmodern world skeptical of group identities?  The former question 
focuses on the theoretical framework that grounds much postmodernist discourse: as a 
specifically masculinist framework, in claiming the inauthenticity of all grand narratives, these 
discourses refer to a very specific position of masculine subjectivity within grand narratives and 
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neglect the different subjective positions that women and other marginalized groups occupy 
within this narrative.  Examined in this way, postmodernist discourses may be understood as a 
final attempt to assimilate difference by presuming that a supposedly universal understanding of 
subjectivity underlies their deconstructive efforts.  In effect, inclusion rather than exclusion is 
problematized by this question, as participation in these postmodernist discourses seems to 
require feminist acquiescence to the patriarchal understanding of history, phenomenology, and 
subjectivity that serves as the foundation of these discourses, decreasing the supposed plurality 
of an “open system” of knowledge like the one Lyotard envisions.  The fear of naïve 
participation in these patriarchal foundations has, not surprisingly, all too often resulted in 
ominous and apocalyptic predictions concerning the future of feminism within postmodernist 
discursive spaces: Seyla Benhabib, for example, in Situating the Self: Gender, Community and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, purports that “postmodernist position(s) thought 
through to their conclusions may eliminate not only the specificity of feminist theory but place in 
question the very emancipatory ideals of the women‟s movements altogether” (213).  Benhabib‟s 
prediction expresses concern for the continued political efficacy of feminism, but it points to a 
crisis in legitimation that is becoming increasingly prominent in third-wave feminist discourses 
as subjectivity, either masculine or feminine, becomes increasingly suspect.   
Faced with the skepticism of postmodernist discourses and the poststructuralist theories 
of gender espoused by critics such as Julia Kristeva and Hélène Cixous, which reject gendered 
subjectivity as a metaphysical construct created within a linguistic and philosophical game that 
maintains coherence using binary oppositions,
2
 third-wave feminism is beginning to question the 
                                                 
2
 Much of this skepticism was grounded in the poststructuralist theory of critics such as Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, and Roland Barthes.  Kristeva, following the poststructuralist theory of Derrida, espouses that women 
should abandon the masculine/feminine dichotomy altogether because “the very dichotomy. . .as an opposition 
between two rival entities may be understood as belonging to metaphysics,” which prompts her to ask “[w]hat can 
„identity‟, even „sexual identity‟, mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where the very notion of identity is 
challenged” (qtd. in Moi 12-13)?  Likewise, Cixous uses poststructuralist thought to conclude that women are 
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necessity of establishing a strategic feminine subject position.  If postmodernist discourses, as 
Waugh writes in Feminine Fictions, express the “loss of belief in the concept of the human 
subject as an agent effectively intervening in history” (9), and “[f]eminism seeks a subjective 
identity, a sense of effective agency and history for women which has hitherto been denied them 
by the dominant culture” (9), then have critics not come to an impasse regarding the future of 
feminism as a political movement?  Toril Moi, in Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary 
Theory, notes the importance of acknowledging deconstructed forms of feminism but insists that 
“it still remains politically essential for feminists to defend women as women in order to 
counteract the patriarchal oppression that precisely despises women as women” (13).  Moi‟s 
claim essentially asserts, therefore, that challenging the sovereignty of patriarchally produced 
and legitimated narratives requires the construction of a feminine identity that is capable of 
expressing counter-sovereignty when faced with these narratives.  Feminine subjectivity in this 
political strategy comes to act as a legitimation tool for feminist political actions because it 
establishes a specific and predetermined end toward which feminist actions act as the means.  
Merely a “justificatory strateg[y]. . .to guide choices in theory, research, and politics” (Harding 
89), feminine subjectivity becomes the center of an emancipatory movement that, like the 
limiting patriarchal grand narratives it challenges, demands performance from its supporters.  
Zerilli contends that, in the absence of this “justificatory strategy,” “third-wave feminism could 
be experienced as nothing other than a crisis: a virtual free-for-all in political opinions and 
judgments that can produce no knowledge whatsoever [and that] threatens to destroy the very 
possibility of coming to an agreement about what the proper ends of politics are” (132).  To 
                                                                                                                                                             
subsumed within an oppositional relationship with men, suggesting that “[w]herever an ordering intervenes, a law 
organizes the thinkable by. . .oppositions” (264) before asserting that “hierarchization subjects the entire conceptual 
organization to man.  A male privilege, which can be seen in the opposition by which it sustains itself, between 
activity and passivity” (265).  Cixous suggests that this opposition which oppresses women may be deconstructed 
through the active realization and reiteration of its existence, for once one recognizes that the alterity of women is 
used by men to establish masculine superiority then the opposition necessarily becomes unstable and renders 
gendered subjectivity meaningless.   
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avoid this crisis of legitimation, Zerilli suggests that feminists abandon the “subject question” 
(the term she uses to denote feminism‟s adherence to the construction of subjectivity) and 
transform their understanding of political action by making it independent from, indeed 
exclusionary to, sovereignty. 
The latter of Zerilli‟s calls to action—the reconfiguration of how political action should 
be undertaken—does seem to be necessary, but the complete abandonment of the notion of 
subjectivity seems rather dangerous given the immense social inequalities with which the 
feminist movement concerns itself.  Zerilli relies upon the political philosophy that Hannah 
Arendt espouses in The Human Condition to make her critique of feminism, and Arendt‟s theory 
takes as its framework the ancient Greek distinction between public and private space.  
According to Arendt, relationships in the private space are “born of necessity, and necessity 
rule[s] over all activities performed in it” (30), leading to a hierarchized space that demands a 
sovereign who can decide upon appropriate actions.  Conversely, the public space honours 
plurality because it represents a space in which “to be free mean[s] to be free from the inequality 
present in rulership and to move in a sphere where neither rule nor being ruled exist[s]” (33).  
Within this plural public space, Margaret Canovan asserts in her study of Arendt, the concerns of 
our constructed world are made visible, making way for a conception of unity that is not 
dependent upon our association with others “like” us but, rather, on the relational space that is 
created when people come together to discuss those narratives that affect all people (634).  
However, the rise of the social sphere has conflated the private and public spheres and resulted in 
a situation in which political action becomes predetermined epistemologically, transforming the 
political group into a family-like entity that performs actions in accordance with necessity 
(Arendt 29).  Arendt‟s is an astute understanding of political action and illuminates the dangers 
of epistemologies in political movements such as feminism, but its atavistic reliance on ancient 
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Greek political ideology seems unrealistic in a modern Western society that has been so 
profoundly affected by the social sphere.  For example, as Benhabib points out, through the 
extension of the social space “[t]he emancipation of workers made property relations into a 
public-political issue; the emancipation of women has meant that the family and the so-called 
private sphere become political issues; the attainment of rights by non-white and non-Christian 
peoples has put cultural questions and collective self- and other-representations on the „public‟ 
agenda” (94).  A return to strict distinctions between the public and private space may have the 
desired effect of removing sovereignty from the public space, but, and this is especially the case 
with an author like Shields who deals with the private lives of women and men, it may also limit 
the issues available for discussion within the public space.  For Zerilli, feminism‟s descent into 
the epistemology that Arendt warns against is a product of its fixation on feminine subjectivity, 
but I believe that all the tools needed to accomplish the abandonment of epistemology may, 
instead, be found in a reconception that highlights the similarities between ideas of women‟s 
relational identity and postmodernist discourses that challenge unitary subjectivity.  What seems 
necessary is a conception of feminine subjectivity that remains unconcerned with legitimation 
(effectively eliminating the limitations associated with feminist epistemologies centered on 
validating a universal subjectivity) but that still offers women the presence they need to effect 
change in a discursive space that is not yet equally willing to hear their voices.   
Simone de Beauvoir‟s famous statement in The Second Sex, “One is not born, but rather 
becomes, a woman” (301), recognized that woman is a construction of masculinist imaginations, 
the result of an alterity that positions woman as the negative upon which man can define himself 
and find self-realization (157).  Given this history of apparent inauthenticity, it seems natural that 
feminist discourses should look to women‟s positions of marginality to begin (re)creating their 
subjectivities within the postmodern world.  In Feminine Fictions, Waugh examines the 
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marginalized positions that women occupy within masculine grand narratives and argues that the 
principles of postmodernist theories of subjectivity have been represented in women‟s writing for 
many years and merely take a different route to the postmodernist conclusion that subject 
positions are contingent.  The difference is found, she argues, in the way that masculine and 
feminine identity has been expressed throughout patriarchal history.  Man, Waugh claims, has 
historically positioned himself as the sole creator of reality, so he has experienced 
postmodernism as destabilizing because it questions the individual‟s power to construct and 
affect narratives; woman, on the other hand, due to her historic marginalization, has come to 
recognize that identity is necessarily constructed by the community that she inhabits (9-10).  This 
recognition means that the “insights gained as feminism passed through a necessary stage of 
pursuing unity have produced an alternative conception of the subject as constructed through 
relationship, rather than postmodernism/post-structuralism‟s anti-humanist rejection of the 
subject” (13).  To understand subjectivity relationally is to understand that one is able to occupy 
a space that is both inside and outside one‟s own life story, making it possible to imagine a 
public space similar to that which Zerilli proposes.  The public space becomes (rather than an 
agonistic space in which sovereignty is exerted over the Other) a plural space that represents an 
“objective and subjective „in-between,‟ which at once gathers individuals together and separates 
them” (Zerilli 21, paraphrasing Arendt).  Unconcerned with legitimating one‟s subjectivity 
through recourse to what Shields terms in The Stone Diaries a “kernel of authenticity” (whether 
that kernel be related to race, gender, class or another social categorization is immaterial), one is 
able to speak and act with freedom within a relational public space in which Others may interact 
with and challenge these actions.  Creating knowledge in such a space would be congruous with 
the legitimation through paralogy that Lyotard advocates, as it would necessarily be created 
through retrospection and would embrace above all else the original input of all participants.  
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Exposing a Subjectivity “Written in Imagination‟s Invisible Ink”: Shields‟s The Stone Diaries 
Postmodernist discourses are certainly the catalyst for Shields‟s deconstruction of Daisy‟s 
subjectivity in The Stone Diaries—indeed, Shields described the book in interviews as a 
“postmodern box-within-the-box, within-the-box” (“Golden Book” 58 and “Always a Book-
Oriented Kid” 50).  Lyotard‟s theory of absence seems particularly pertinent to this novel, as 
Shields suggests “it‟s a search for meaning or authenticity and it isn‟t found” (“Always a Book-
Oriented Kid” 53).  Nevertheless, many critical interpretations of the novel have attempted to 
discover what is “real” within the novel.  Many of the critics who have written about The Stone 
Diaries recognize that postmodernist discourses are the impetus behind Shields‟s complex 
examination of subjectivity, yet many of them, despite pointing out the ways in which Shields 
deconstructs Daisy‟s subjectivity, have trouble managing not to reconstruct Daisy in some way 
so as to locate something (anything) authentic within the apparent vacuity of Daisy‟s life.  For 
example, Hans Bak suggests that Daisy‟s absence reveals Shields‟s recognition of the 
poststructuralist/postmodernist challenge to unitary identity and, in effect, positions the reader as 
biographer, asking him or her to reconstruct Daisy from the scant information provided (14).  
Simone Vauthier examines the genre of the novel and suggests that Shields creates a liminal 
space in which fiction and biography collide to establish chaotics (the recognition that small 
events may have large effects or vice versa) as the best representative of human subjectivity.  
The reader, she suggests, cannot create a complete understanding of Daisy‟s subjectivity but may 
create order from disorder by following the tenuous connections between the various pieces of 
Daisy‟s life (187).  Likewise, Gordon Slethaug purports that Shields uses chaotics to challenge 
traditional humanist narrative forms, a strategy that he believes leads to the conclusion that “the 
subject is the site of contradictory impulses and multi-vocalic utterances, which are always-
 Winquist 13 
 
already never our own—but which, Shields maintains, the imagination can seize and reshape” 
(59).  Finally, David Williams, in two articles on The Stone Diaries, examines Daisy‟s 
autobiography in terms of the problems it presents in relation to subject unity, stating that 
Daisy‟s isolation and absence makes it necessary for her to imaginatively (re)construct her 
subjectivity through those around her (“Re-Imagining a Stone Angel” 136).  In “Making Stories, 
Making Selves: „Alternate Versions‟ in The Stone Diaries,” he equates the reader‟s search for 
Daisy with her own search for self, suggesting that Daisy is able to reconstruct her life because 
she has “been able to gather enough scraps of family history that, in keeping with the dominant 
scripts of culture, allow her to invent corroborating witnesses for her story, setting these 
„witnesses‟ in a form of dialogical counterpoint that belatedly does the work of [the] „memory 
talk‟” (15) in which families generally engage.   
In one way or another, all of these articles correctly expose the postmodernist challenge 
to the humanist self in The Stone Diaries, but they fail to consider that the root of Daisy‟s 
subjectivity is different than that expressed in traditional humanism.  While these critics 
recognize that Daisy creates her identity relationally (indeed they understand that Daisy as a 
subject is often constructed through or by those around her), they see this relational subjectivity 
as a puzzle from which one may extrapolate something that approaches the authenticity that 
humanism seeks to achieve through unity.  Bak‟s insistence that the reader must piece Daisy 
together, Vauthier‟s suggestion that connections both big and small capture “more of „reality‟ 
than the constraints [humanist unity] from which the novel breaks away would allow” (187), 
Slethaug‟s projection that Daisy‟s imaginative reinvention of her identity establishes her as the 
“nexus of a system of dispositions and her own agency” (60), and Williams‟s suggestion that 
Daisy recreates her identity by imagining the “memory-talk” of her family all hinge on the 
presupposition that subjectivity requires legitimation from some “kernel of authenticity.”  
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Essentially, these accounts of Daisy‟s relational subjectivity attempt to impose unity on a 
character who evades it at every turn, acting to re-stabilize Shields‟s deconstructed protagonist; 
Shields seeks fragmentation, lack of definition, and contingency in The Stone Diaries, so rather 
than (re)constructing Daisy, a more prudent approach is to ask not who is constructed within the 
novel but how the self is conceived within the novel.  
In traditional biographies and biographical fictions, subjectivity, inasmuch as it is 
coherent and unitary, is used to facilitate the construction of a real or authentic self.  Humanist 
ideology suggests that this authentic self “is the sole author of history and the literary text” (Moi 
8), offering the narratives one uses to recount oneself “a firm perspective from which to judge 
the world” (Moi 9).  Such a perspective may be thought of as a center or “kernel of authenticity” 
around which one can create an identity, but Daisy‟s entire life story is deeply fragmented, 
blatantly bringing the reader to understand that what he or she is receiving from Daisy is merely 
a verisimilar version of events.  Daisy, the reader is told, “possesses. . .the startling ability to 
draft alternate versions” (190) of her life, and if one were to ask her to narrate her life story it 
would be “written with imagination‟s invisible ink” (149), producing “an edited hybrid version” 
(283) that would represent a “blend of distortion and omission” (283).3  Just how ambiguous and 
contingent Daisy‟s version of events is becomes apparent when one examines the interaction 
between Daisy as first-person narrator and the third-person narrator who narrates a substantial 
portion of the novel.  As Wendy Roy notes in “Autobiography As Critical Practice in The Stone 
Diaries,” Daisy is often displaced within her own story by “an omniscient or judgmental narrator 
who refers to Daisy in the third person, who undercuts her version of events, but who may 
represent the ironic or questioning voice of Daisy herself” (118).  In one passage, for example, 
                                                 
3
 These are but a few small quotations from much larger passages in which Daisy‟s authority is questioned.  
Throughout the book, there are five large passages that one may look to in order gain an appreciation of how suspect 
Daisy‟s authority is.  They occur on pages 75-78, 148-49, 190-192, 282-83, and 357-360, and, as Wendy Roy points 
out, most occur at different stages in Daisy‟s life while she lies in bed contemplating her life (130). 
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the third-person narrator, addressing the reader directly, warns that “you want to take Daisy‟s 
representation of events with a grain of salt, a bushel of salt” (148), while in an earlier passage 
the reader cannot be sure which viewpoint he or she is receiving.  Contemplating Daisy‟s 
childhood illness with the measles, the narrator(s) state that “[t]he long days of isolation, of 
silence, the torment of boredom—all these pressed down on me, on young Daisy Goodwill and 
emptied her out” (75).  Rapidly shifting from first to third person, this passage and others like it 
create ambiguity as Daisy herself is marginalized by a third-person narrator who claims 
objectivity by displacing Daisy‟s subjective “I,” making the establishment of authenticity 
impossible as the reader becomes increasingly aware that all points of view may originate from 
the subjective viewpoint of Daisy.  In essence, it seems as if Daisy “lives outside her story as 
well as inside” (123) as she retrospectively comments upon the events in her life.  Indeed, as 
Williams points out, one is not remiss in believing that “imagination might be the only sure 
ground of subjectivity” in this novel (“Re-imagining a Stone Angel”135), because everything 
may be imagined by Daisy herself.  This view seems to give Daisy incredible power within her 
own life, for she appears able to reimagine her own identity, but a closer examination of how she 
constructs her subjectivity and how she imagines that her father, Cuyler Goodwill, constructs his 
subjectivity reveals that Daisy, at least in part, understands that her self is created relationally in 
accordance with her social positioning. 
Daisy imagines that both her father‟s identity and her own are fluid throughout their 
lives, but there is a fundamental difference in the way that she understands his subjectivity as 
compared to her own.  This difference focuses on the positions that men and women occupy 
within their own life narratives and becomes evident in a passage that comes after her tragic and 
short-lived marriage to Harold A. Hoad: 
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Men, it seemed to me in those days, were uniquely honored by the stories that 
erupted in their lives, whereas women were more likely to be smothered by theirs. 
. . . Why should men be allowed to strut under the privilege of their life 
adventures, wearing them like a breastful of medals, while women went all gray 
and silent beneath theirs?  The stories that happen to women blow themselves up 
as big as balloons and cover over the day-to-day measure of their lives, swelling 
and pressing with such fierceness that even the plain and simple separations of 
time—hours, weeks, months—get lost from view. (121-2) 
As the protagonists of their own stories, it seems to Daisy as narrator, men are positioned at the 
center of their stories, controlling their narratives and deciding what part people, objects, and 
events will play in their reality.  Thus, she imagines Cuyler‟s life as a series of selves clearly 
delineated by temporal periods, each with a center that provides his identity a definition that, 
while changing over time, confers upon him authenticity. 
Respectively, love, religion, art, and commerce all captivate Cuyler Goodwill at one time 
or another during his life (91-2), and these centers help to structure his subjectivity and his 
actions.  When he is married to Mercy, for example, “Niagara in all its force” (7) is the image 
that Daisy as narrator uses to describe the intense ardour that she imagines her father expresses 
toward her mother; she also imagines that it is through his love for Mercy that he “learn[s] to feel 
the reality of the world or understand the particularities of sense and reflection that others have 
taken as their right” (34-5).  For Cuyler, then, his love for Mercy acts as the center of his reality 
and he comes to understand the world based upon that love.  It allows him to overcome “the 
poverty of his own beginnings” (35) and affects the way he constructs reality, evident in his 
revitalized interpretation of the communities he passes on his way home from the quarry: “A 
number of Galician families have settled lately in this area, building their squat windowless 
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cottages which the women plaster over with a mixture of mud and straw.  At one time [Cuyler] 
would have looked at such houses and imagined nothing but misery within.  Now he knows 
better.  Now he has had a glimpse of paradise and sees it everywhere” (36).  Imbued with the 
spirit of love, Cuyler (in Daisy‟s imagination) reconstructs the reality that he inhabits in order to 
make it fit with his own experiences; he inscribes his love with ontological status inasmuch as it 
provides him with the “kernel of authenticity” that allows him to establish an identity that serves 
to unify his understanding of the world.  Mercy‟s death disrupts this center, however, and 
necessitates the re-stabilization of his identity with a shift to a new center.  Inspired by the 
sudden appearance of a rainbow, he dedicates himself to religion and, believing Mercy‟s 
gravestone “pitifully inadequate” (58), builds a stone tower to commemorate the person who 
formerly served to legitimate his identity.  When people begin to take notice of the beauty of his 
tower, he replaces the religious fervour that initiated the tower with artistic fervour, choosing to 
define himself through a devotion to art.  Each incarnation affects the way that Cuyler 
understands his world and is always accompanied by a (re)discovery of his voice, for by 
obsessively recounting himself and others through the center that defines each incarnation he is 
able to redefine the world constantly to accord with his current narrative. 
The Stone Diaries presents several theories to explain Cuyler‟s ability to speak so 
fluently, and each theory attends to the various incarnations he goes through, denoting the role 
that language plays each time he recreates his reality.  Initially, according to Cuyler, his ability to 
speak came while he was married to Mercy.  “[T]he stone in his throat became dislodged” (84) 
during their brief time together as, lying in bed with his wife and facilitated by the love that then 
structured his subjectivity, he expressed all his longings to her in whispers that Mercy met with 
“a kind of mute encouragement” (84).  Having not been made to feel foolish or awkward in these 
musings, Cuyler realizes the power of speech, understanding Mercy‟s silence as her agreement to 
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the private narratives he uses to recount their lives together and encouraging him to begin 
constructing all of reality as if he were its sole creator and love its language.  Thus, while Cuyler 
finds his voice within his relationship with Mercy, it is accompanied by her “sighing 
acquiescence” (33) as she, recognizing “the value of half a loaf” (33), puts up with his eager 
advances because he is able to provide her with the house she never thought she would have.  As 
the “object rather than the subject of desire” (Roy 128), Mercy is ironically (perhaps 
tragicomically) marginalized within Cuyler‟s narrative; she is at once the muse of his perception 
and that which is ultimately silenced and, therefore, obscured. 
His second avatar, religion, coming as “that sudden rainbow, that October anointing” 
(85), confirms Cuyler‟s growing confidence in his ability to place himself at the center of his 
own reality.  Daisy as narrator imagines that he does not embrace religion in an effort to give his 
life meaning or to act as a framework capable of structuring reality, but, instead, bends and forms 
religion to his needs by using it to re-define the identity he loses after Mercy dies.  Religion‟s 
“narratives frankly puzzled him” (85) and when he does attend worship he feels marginalized by 
the excessive speech of others: 
The noisiness of public worship—singing, praying, chanting, preaching—make 
him uneasy.  The vestments of holy men, even the simple white Methodist collar, 
abrade his sensibilities, crowd him to the edge of his belief, and the dusted, 
raftered, churchy spaces assault him with their perfume and polish, belittling him, 
taunting him.  Moreover, his natural instincts feel constrained by the order of holy 
service, the breathy invocations and amens and numbered hymns. . . . (62) 
His feeling of alterity in the presence of religion‟s powerful narratives drives him to a form of 
religion that is very private to begin with—little more than “a series of ritualized steps” and the 
recital of some chosen scripture (63)—but that becomes more public as Goodwill Tower grows 
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in size.
4
  Producing the tower becomes an obsession; he believes “that the earth‟s rough minerals 
are the signature of the spiritual, and as such can be assembled and shaped into praise and 
affirmation” (63), so rather than the tower representing a physical expression of the new 
spirituality that flows through him, it comes to represent his control over and reconfiguration of 
religion.  Once again, Daisy positions Cuyler as the sole narrator of his own reality, and her 
assertion that “[l]anguage spoke through him, and not—as is the usual case—the other way 
around” (85) denotes both the presence and the power within the public space that she as a 
woman does not possess, for although he adopts the grand narrative of religion as the language 
that he uses to establish his identity, Cuyler still remains powerful by ensuring he remains at the 
center of what this language is used to define.  The equilibrium between retaining the power to 
construct his own identity and the submission of this identity to the religious center that gives it 
authority is possible because Cuyler believes that “the human and the divine are balanced across 
a dazzling equation: man‟s creation of God being exactly equal to God‟s creation of man, one 
unified mind bending like a snake around the curve of earth and heaven” (66).  Such a statement, 
of course, appears paradoxical because it offers neither God nor humans precedence in creation.  
However, juxtaposed with Cuyler‟s understanding that religion is a signifier of identity (his 
religious monument is as much a symbol of his identity as it is a symbol of his spirituality) rather 
than a narrative through which identity is signified, such paradox can be explained as a way to 
abate his fear of marginalization within the religious grand narrative. 
His shifts from religious convert to artist to businessperson are, likewise, accompanied by 
shifts in Cuyler‟s language as he reimagines his identity, and, as such, his conception of identity 
                                                 
4
 I make my critique of this tower fully aware that the third-person narrator who periodically replaces Daisy notes 
that Daisy may have dreamed the tower into existence (76).  Because it seems futile to question the existence of the 
tower when all the reader is given, in any case, is the subjective account of Daisy (who is undeniably unreliable), I 
use it as an example of the way that Daisy imagines masculine subjectivity.  This analysis is intended to highlight 
the differences between the way Daisy constructs her identity and the way Cuyler, within Daisy‟s imagination, 
constructs his identity, rather than to establish the authenticity of Daisy‟s account of Cuyler‟s life. 
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is largely synonymous with the problematic linguistic structure of knowledge that deconstructive 
ideology exposes.  Jacques Derrida, for example, points out that the linguistic structures that 
Western society uses to construct knowledge “must be thought of as a series of substitutions of 
center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center.  Successively, and in a 
regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names” (90).  The center limits what 
may be legitimately represented within the narrative‟s boundaries by setting the conditions for 
inclusion and exclusion, so whenever a variable challenges the center of the narrative, the center 
must restabilize itself in order to maintain its coherence.  In Cuyler‟s re-formation of his identity 
from religious convert to artist, one sees this constant readjustment of his center, for “God has 
receded, a mere shadow, and as for Mercy—her grave so sunken and grown over—he cannot 
recollect the look of her face of the outline of her body” (73); consequently, his marriage and his 
conversion “seem no more than curious intersections in a life that is stretching itself forward” 
(73).  He remains the center of his own narrative, only shifting periodically to readjust his 
identity when he either loses his center (Mercy) or discovers a new center (religion, art, and 
commerce).  The ease with which Cuyler goes through these “metamorphoses” seems 
emancipatory, for, as he nonchalantly explains, each center represents “a chapter in [his] life” 
(92), which remains ever-welcoming to change and redefinition.  However, the reader is asked to 
consider the constraints that Cuyler‟s incessant search for some “kernel of authenticity” places 
upon his subjectivity because, as the third-person narrator (who may be Daisy) suggests, 
Cuyler‟s search grows from a “tortuous biographical root” (92) that seems to demand unity.  
Cuyler may be flexible with regards to the way that he understands the dynamism of his identity, 
but his conception of identity is still founded upon the humanist principle that subjectivity must 
remain constant to a point of origin that may confer legitimacy.  His search for unity may, 
therefore, be equated with what Roland Barthes calls the humanist critical search for the 
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“Author-God” that “is thought to nourish the book” (148), as he seeks nourishment for his life 
from the various centers he uses to define himself.  Furthermore, just as Barthes asserts that “[t]o 
give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified” (149), 
Cuyler‟s narrative is limited by his adherence to the centers he imposes on his subjectivity.  He 
must live his life doing “[o]ne thing at a time” (92), so the centers of his identity are “attended by 
[an] abstinence” (92) that focuses his energy solely on that one thing.  All that has come before 
the present notion of his identity is forgotten as nostalgic and useless, the casualty of an identity 
ever pushing forward and rediscovering itself: “[f]or days at a time he is able to forget that he is 
the father of a child, a little girl named Daisy” (59); his country of birth, Canada, may as well be 
“on the other side of the moon” (93) now that he has moved to Indiana; and his first wife, Mercy, 
eventually holds such a tiny place in his narrative that he forgets her name as he lies dying in his 
yard (275). 
Daisy, in contrast to Cuyler, feels as if there is a “vacuum. . .in the middle of her life” 
(75) that creates absence where the “kernel of authenticity” should be; she is better represented 
as an accumulation of the various narratives that surround her and comes to realize that her 
biography “would be, if such a thing were ever to be written, an assemblage of dark voids and 
unbridgable gaps” (75-76; sic).  No such pragmatic organization of her life into temporal or 
situational compartments is possible in Daisy‟s life, for her contingent identity is a product of 
others‟ needs or desires, an amalgam of the roles she fulfills throughout her life.  Her dependence 
upon others‟ representations of her to create her own identity becomes most evident as she 
imagines her own death and as those others try to theorize her depression.  In the final chapter of 
The Stone Diaries Daisy is looking “forward toward her own death” (358) and wondering how 
she will be remembered through the random artifacts she leaves behind.  Somewhere amongst 
the fragmented conversations, a luncheon menu (352), a recipe for lemon pudding (352), the 
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numerous lists about her life—books she read (355), groups she belonged to (346), shopping lists 
(353-354), things she never did (344), lingerie (349), health concerns (357), and homes (360)—
and the miscellaneous death notices, eulogies, and tombstone engravings is located Daisy 
Goodwill Flett.  Is she to be found in the eulogy that refers to her as “„Grandma‟ Flett,” loving 
wife of Barker Flett, mother of three, grandmother of nine, great-grandmother of three, and 
great-aunt of two (343)?  Or is she truly discoverable in the college notes and essays she leaves 
for Warren (347-348), the product of an education at Long College for Women where she had 
once written eloquently about Camillo Cavour and Italian independence (251)?  Or, further still, 
is she the “woman who made a terrific meatloaf, who knew how to repot a drooping rubber 
plant, who bid a smart no-trump hand, who wore a hat well, who looked after her personal 
hygiene, who wrote her thank-you notes promptly, who kept up, who went down, went down and 
down and down, who missed the point, the point of it all, but was, nevertheless, almost 
unfailingly courteous to others” (354)?  The truth (by which I mean something closer to a 
summation of all Daisy‟s selves than to the expression of authenticity) is that she is or has been 
all three and more.  She is a construction of the narratives that surround her, a contingent 
representation of the position(s) that she occupies or has occupied in the social and familial web 
that she inhabits, and it is through the fractured segments of others‟ conversations that she 
imagines her existence.   
Rather than being the sole creator of a self capable of shaping and constructing her reality 
in accordance with a fixed subjectivity, she imagines her selves assembled for her, the result not 
of an internal essence but of an external presence in relation to others.  Thus, while Cuyler 
remains at the center of the theories used to describe the discovery of his voice, the theories 
about the origin of Daisy‟s depression seem to move progressively further away from Daisy 
herself.  For example, Daisy‟s daughter Alice suggests that her mother, having “veered, 
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accidently, into her own life” (237) by becoming a columnist after Barker‟s death, was depressed 
due to the recent termination of her job; Fraidy Hoyt contradicts Alice‟s feminist beliefs 
concerning work and claims that Daisy‟s suppressed sexual desire is responsible for her current 
depression (245); Cora-Mae Milltown attributes the depression to the fact that Daisy lost her 
mother at such a young age (255); and Skoot Skutari, noting his grandfather‟s presence at 
Daisy‟s birth, believes that the loneliness that attended Daisy‟s birth never left her, even though 
he has never met Daisy and could not know of her depression (260).  The speaker‟s relationship 
to Daisy, not Daisy herself, becomes the focal point of each theory (which Daisy may herself be 
projecting onto the theorizer), so, as Roy points out, each theory “reveals much more about that 
other than it does about Daisy” (123).  Roy understands Daisy‟s absence aptly as a way both to 
express and to critique women‟s relational identity in fictive life writing, noting that she almost 
becomes lost “in the interconnections that constitute her sense of self” (119).  However, I argue, 
further, that Shields uses Daisy‟s absence to demonstrate that a relational understanding of 
subjectivity can illuminate the liminal spaces that postmodernist discourses try to create by 
exposing those metaprescriptives that structure knowledge within grand narratives. 
In order to understand the effect that metaprescriptives have on the production of 
knowledge and subjectivity, one needs first to establish the liminal position that Daisy inhabits 
between oftentimes competing narratives.  Cuyler, in his marathon address “A Heritage in 
Stone” (86) to the female graduates of Long College, uses his favorite metaphor of Salem 
limestone—a freestone that “can be split equally in either direction, that. . .has no natural bias” 
(116)—to tell the young women eloquently that they may master their own narratives.  He 
implores them to “think of this miraculous freestone material as the substance of [their] lives” 
(116), assuring them that with the “tools of intelligence” (116) received from the college they 
may “make of [their] lives one thing or the other” (116) and, in effect, construct their realities.  
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Freestone is, of course, a metaphor that fits Cuyler‟s own life perfectly, but another marathon 
speech—that given by Daisy‟s future mother-in-law, Mrs. Arthur Hoad—more accurately 
describes the technique that Daisy must use to form her identity: 
First, let me say that you have had the benefit of a college education, and have 
acquired a certain range of familiarity in the liberal arts, but I do hope you won‟t 
let this advantage impinge on normal marital harmony.  That is, I hope you won‟t 
be tempted to parade your knowledge before those who have not elected the same 
path.  (102) 
On one hand, Cuyler‟s loquacious address speaks of the power that these young women now 
possess to shape their lives in any direction; on the other hand, Mrs. Hoad‟s speech demands that 
Daisy “forget” this knowledge in order to make a more congenial wife to her son who did not 
pursue higher education.  Daisy‟s identity, therefore, will be a hybrid representation of multiple 
narratives, and her realization of this polyvalent social positioning becomes apparent as she looks 
back on her memories about a childhood bout of measles.  After concluding that even then the 
young Daisy knew the world would continue its course without her presence, the third-person 
narrator who takes over Daisy‟s voice revises this memory to include the “knowledge that here, 
this place, was where she would continue to live her life, where she had, in fact, always lived—
blinded, throttled, erased from the record of her own existence” (76).  The depth of this 
perception given “the solipsistic way of children” (76), combined with the passage‟s use of the 
third-person pronoun to describe a personal event in the distant past, demonstrates that Daisy 
occupies a rather different position in her narrative than Cuyler occupies in his.  Her position is 
both inside and outside her own narrative: as an insider, she participates in the narratives that 
define normative behaviour, but as an outsider, she is able to recognize that her identity is a 
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makeshift result of the numerous narratives she lives within and that she is unable to occupy any 
one identity that may be called authentic.   
 The narrative that most profoundly exposes the multitudinous position that Daisy inhabits 
is the heteronormative narrative that Mrs. Hoad expresses in her premarital instructions, for 
Daisy, throughout her married life with both her first and second husbands, feels compelled to 
act in ways commensurate with contemporary conceptions of domesticity and femininity.  
Monique Wittig likens heterosexuality to a social contract that people “never formally 
enunciate[] but that nevertheless everybody knows and applies like magic” (“On the Social 
Contract” 39), and suggests that this heteronormativity confers upon women a “centuries-old 
commitment to childbearing as the female creative act” (“One is Not Born a Woman” 11), 
creating a “natural” gender distinction in which women‟s inclinations and desires are 
subordinated to their social position as wives and mothers.  Naturalizing gender in this way 
establishes the heterosexual relationship as that upon which both the economy and culture are 
dependent, and this naturalization produces a self-legitimating closed system of knowledge that 
demands the performance of knowledge rather than the discovery of new ideas.  The 
performance of gender is discussed in detail in Gender Trouble by Judith Butler, who notes that 
gender is a performance inasmuch as it “is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated 
acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of 
substance, of a natural sort of being” (45).  To perform gender is to recount oneself through and 
act in accordance with those actions that are considered gender normative within one‟s society.  
While one can make a connection between Butler‟s recognition that gender is performed and 
Lyotard‟s recognition that knowledge is performed, a distinction must be made concerning the 
way each theorist believes performance is to be challenged.  Butler‟s radical skepticism about 
gender leads to her assertion that gender may be considered performative.  Gender 
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performativity, in Butler‟s ideology, suggests that since one can ascribe to gender “no 
ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute [gender‟s] reality” (185), it is 
possible to subvert gender by “acting out” gender‟s manifestations.  Radical skepticism of gender 
roles does not, however, seem to be the intent of Shields‟s acknowledgement that Daisy performs 
her gender; instead, her intent is more commensurate with Lyotard‟s, who, contra Butler, 
believes that performance is to be challenged by recognizing and acknowledging those spaces 
and people that represent the unknown within grand narratives.  
It is evident from the beginning of the courtship between Daisy and her second husband, 
Barker Flett, that Daisy believes she is performing a social and gender obligation by marrying 
him.  As if following the advice of Mrs. Hoad, Daisy constrains her own “intellectual ease and 
energy” (251) as she writes her letters to Barker “girlishly, frivolously,” with sentences that are 
“apocalyptically incomplete” (145).  Eventually she accepts her imminent marriage to Barker 
based not on “what is possible, but rather [on] what possibilities remain” (147) to her as “a 
woman on the verge of middle age” (147).  Feeling as though she is a person out of options who 
has been “accidentally misplaced” (147), she accepts “„it‟ [marriage] without protest, without 
question, for what choice has she” (150).  Daisy is compelled to marry Barker because, as a 
woman, she feels obligated to become a wife and mother, so Daisy, regardless of what she 
actually desires, fulfills this natural obligation.  By acting in accordance with the 
heteronormative narrative that structures her society, Daisy discovers presence within the 
narrative through performance, a performance that becomes even more noticeable once she is 
married to Barker.  After making a meal in a sweltering kitchen, Daisy goes upstairs to fix 
herself up before Barker‟s return, amazing her young son Warren with her refreshed appearance 
which reminds him of the women in Oxydol ads (160).  As “part of the mid-century squadron of 
women who believed in centerpieces” (236) and well-planned meals, Daisy performs domesticity 
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in order to conform to the contemporary understanding of gender roles within a heterosexual 
relationship.  She discovers this understanding of her gender role from women‟s magazines such 
as Good Housekeeping, McCalls, and The Canadian Home Companion (185), which Betty 
Friedan notes confined women to “the physical care and serving of husband, children, and home” 
(31).  Therefore, Roy points out that even though, “[a]s Daisy‟s kitchen language shows, she 
finds domesticity a kind of hell” (137), she performs this hell as it is depicted in “magazines that 
Friedan decries as essentializing and restrictive” (137); consequently, one comes to understand 
that Daisy is, in fact, participating in a masquerade that hides her within gender performance.  
Such masquerade is apparent in the Fletts‟ sex life, too, as Daisy, remembering one magazine 
article that suggested that you should “[t]ry to make your husband believe that you are always 
ready for his entreaties” (186), lies “bathed, powdered, diaphragmed, and softly nightgowned” 
(186) awaiting her husband and his imminent sexual ardor with trepidation.  Daisy once again 
finds strength in women‟s magazines that propagate the ideal that women “find fulfillment only 
in sexual passivity, male domination, and nurturing maternal love” (Friedan 37), and she comes 
to the conclusion that sex “is something that has to be put up with” (186). 
The fact that Daisy willingly participates in this masquerade does not necessarily mean 
that she does not understand that she is part of a performance.  Daisy partially understands that 
marrying, first Harold (because “it is „time‟ to marry,” 117) and then Barker (“for what choice 
has she,” 150), is a gender performance, and by acknowledging as much to the reader she reifies 
those spaces neglected in grand narratives by presenting her own absence.  In a passage that 
immediately follows her acquiescing to marriage with Barker, the third-person narrator (who 
may be Daisy herself) admits that “[c]uriously, she is not afraid, knowing as she does that love is 
mostly the avoidance of hurt, and, furthermore, she is accustomed to obstacles, and how they can 
be overcome by readjusting her glance or crowding her concerns into a shadowy corner” (147).  
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By crowding her concerns into a shadowy corner, she reinforces her own absence, creating a 
situation that acknowledges that which is unknown or hidden by her performance augments the 
power of heteronormativity.  Essentially, Daisy becomes “a mute hollow structure that deflects 
meaning and points relentlessly away from her” (99), as Winifred Mellor aptly points out in 
“„The Simple Container of Our Existence‟: Narrative Ambiguity in Carol Shields‟s The Stone 
Diaries,” but this deflection is not as much a warning that her subjectivity is inauthentic as it is a 
recognition that what is perceived to be authentic, the self that she presents to the world, 
demands her absence.  She readjusts her glance to perform her heteronormative obligations 
while, at the same time, the reader is unable to readjust his or her glance because he or she is 
constantly reminded of the absence that this decision creates.  Thus, Shields‟s novel challenges 
the construction of meaning by drawing the reader‟s attention to those aspects of Daisy‟s identity 
that are not represented within her marriage and motherhood as opposed to those aspects that are 
represented. 
 Discussing postmodernist aesthetics in an essay entitled “Answering the Question: What 
is Postmodernism?”, Lyotard gives this very succinct definition of postmodernist art: 
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good 
forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively 
the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not 
in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable.  
(Appendix to The Postmodern Condition, 81) 
Postmodernist art in this conception makes readers and viewers aware of what is missing; it 
challenges knowledge by exposing the alterior spaces that become hidden as grand narratives are 
performed.  While feminist literature, much of which focuses upon exposing the gender 
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inequalities that repress the actions of women within the public sphere, could benefit from a 
conception of art that values the redemption of lost or marginalized voices, the relationship 
between postmodernism and feminism has been strained due to the seemingly impossible task of 
undertaking feminist political action within a postmodernist theoretical climate that remains 
skeptical of gendered subjectivity.  However, Carol Shields‟s work, as Ramon suggests, attempts 
to create this relationship through its commitment “to developing a liminal form which combines 
the experimental techniques associated with postmodernism with the humanist focus of realist 
fiction” (61).  Using this hybrid form in The Stone Diaries, Shields emphasizes the absence of 
her main character by exploring the contingent and relational nature of feminine subjectivity, a 
strategy that, on one hand, provides poignancy to her social criticism concerning the erasure of 
women, yet, on the other hand, avoids essentializing feminine subjectivity by demonstrating that 
Daisy‟s fragmented identity subverts humanist ideologies that presume the existence of some 
“kernel of authenticity.”  By expressing Daisy‟s identity as relational, Shields links feminist 
discourses about women‟s marginality and subjectivity with postmodernist discourses that 
demand contingency, creating a liminal discursive space in which feminist social concerns are 
not subverted by postmodern theories of deconstruction.  Thus, Shields redeems Daisy by 
presenting her as the unpresentable in a public sphere that denies her voice, relentlessly 
acknowledging the unknown within this sphere by not letting the reader forget that Daisy is 
absent from her own existence. 
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